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Chapter 10

The WARN Act
KeyCites: Cases and other legal materials listed in KeyCite Scope
can be researched through West's KeyCite service on Westlaw".
Use KeyCite to check citations for form, parallel references,
prior and later history, and comprehensive citator information,
including citations to other decisions and secondary materials.

§ 10:1
§ 10:2
§ 10:3
§ 10:4
§ 10:5
§ 10:6
§ 10:7
§ 10:8
§ 10:9
§ 10:10

§ 10:11
§ 10:12
§ 10:13
§ 10:14
§ 10:15

§ 10:1

Introduction
Administration and enforcement, in general
Definition of employer under WARN: The "business
enterprise"
-Number of employees
Plant closing or mass layoff defined: Number of affected
employees
-The single site requirement
Requirement of employment loss
Notice requirements
-When less than 60 days' notice is permitted
-When no notice is required
When and where to sue
Remedies
Reduction of employer liability
WARN claims in bankruptcy
Federal laws providing benefits for dislocated workers

Introduction

Plant closings are devastating for workers, their families
and the communities in which they live. 1 The Worker Adjust[Section 10:1]
1Loss of work may take a variety of forms, including subcontracting,
sales of businesses, plant closings, and runaway shops (plants that relocate
to other sites). We address the union's right to bargain over these decisions and their effects in Ch 3.
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ment and Retraining Notification Act 2 ("the WARN Act" or
"WARN") requires some employers to give their workers
sixty days' notice before a plant closing or mass layoff. The
purpose of the WARN Act is to provide workers with time to
seek alternative employment or retraining and to plan for
the transition phase after the layoff.
The WARN Act does not prevent employers from closing a
plant; 3 instead it only requires larger employers to give notice, subject to a number of exceptions and exemptions. It is,
however, the primary piece of federal legislation4 addressing
the problem of plant closings and mass layoffs and, in some
instances, the only source of rights that dislocated workers
have. 5
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101 et seq.
Section 2104(b), in fact, specifically deprives the federal courts of
power to enjoin a plant closing or mass layoff "[u]nder this chapter." See
§ 10:12.
4Several states, including Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin, have enacted some form of plant closing and/or mass layoff law. This manual does not address those state
statutes in any detail.
5This chapter also addresses employees' rights under the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C.A §§ 2271 et seq., and the North American Free Trade
Agreement Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program, 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 2331, in§ 10:15. This Guide also deals with unions' ability to prevent or
bargain over the employer's decision to close a plant or relocate work in
Ch3.
Dislocated workers have also challenged plant closings under other
state and federal statutes. See, e.g., Adama v. Daehler-Jarvis, Div. of NL
Industries, Inc., 144 Mich. App. 764, 376 N.W.2d 406, 43 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1058, 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1[ 35861 (1985) (age
discrimination under Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act); Bell v.
Automobile Club of Michigan, 80 F.R.D. 228, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 575, 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1[ 8484, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 798
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (race discrimination under Title VII); United Steel
Workers of America, Local No. 1330 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1,
103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2925 (N.D. Ohio 1980), afl'd in part, vacated in part,
631 F.2d 1264, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2312, 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1[ 12220 (6th
Cir. 1980) (violation of Sherman Act). The general principles governing
federal antidiscrimination laws are set out in Ch 6.
Some communities have explored the use of their eminent domain
powers to prevent industries from fleeing the area. Steel Valley Authority
v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 6 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1104
(3d Cir. 1987); and see Hornack and Lynd, The Steel Valley Authority, 15
2
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§ 10:2

Administration and enforcement, in general

Although Congress gave the Department of Labor ("DOL'')
authority to promulgate rules and regulations concerning
NYU Rev L & Soc Change 1 (1986-1987) at 113-135. Workers and communities have also relied on the contractual obligations that some employers have undertaken when accepting public funds to prevent that employer
from subsequently relocating its operations. In re Indenture of Trust
dated as of March 1, 1982, 437 N.W.2d 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); but see
Charter Tp. of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., 201 Mich. App. 128, 506
N.W.2d 556, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1165 (1993) (rejecting promissory estoppel claims by city, finding GM's promises to continue work at plant in
return for tax abatements to be mere puffery).
Finally, unionized workers have brought breach-of-contract and related common law tort and contract claims founded on either the collective
bargaining agreement or the collective bargaining relationship. United
Steel Workers of America, Local No. 1330 v. U.S. Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp.
1, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2925 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (promissory estoppel); Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290, 1296, 100 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) f 10894 (S.D. Ohio 1983), afl'd mem 738 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1984)
(same); Atari, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 867, 212 Cal. Rptr.
773 (6th Dist. 1985) (fraud, deceit and violation of California law requiring notice for termination of at-will relationship). The federal courts have
often, although not always, found these claims to be preempted. Milne
Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, 960 F.2d 1401, 143 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2663, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 11016 (9th Cir. 1991) (Section 301 preempts
claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
for interference with prospective economic advantage); Serrano v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 790 F.2d 1279, 1284-88, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2297,
104 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 11889 (6th Cir. 1986) (NLRA preempts state common law claims); Gibson v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 782 F.2d 686, 688689, 2 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 473, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2626, 104 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) f 11781 (7th Cir. 1986) (NLRA preempts state fraud claims);
Marine Transport Lines, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters,
Mates & Pilots, 609 F. Supp. 282, 286-287 (S.D. N.Y. 1985) (federal labor
law preempts tortious interference with union-member relationship claim);
but see Machinists Automotive Trades Dist. Lodge No. 190 of Northern
California v. Peterbilt Motors Co., 666 F. Supp. 1352, 1354-1358, 2 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 884, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2107, 109 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10713
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (state action was improvidently removed to federal court
because state-law contract and tort claims have no analogues under
federal law). We address preemption under both the NLRA and Section
301 in more detail in §§ 2:40 to 2:41, 2:42, while discussing enforcement of
contractual restrictions on an employer's right to relocate unit work in
§ 3:15.
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WARN, 1 it did not give the agency any enforcement powers.
Instead, Congress provided for enforcement of WARN rights
through private lawsuits, which may be filed in federal court
in the district where the violation occurred or where the
employer transacts business. 2
Either individual employees or their representatives may
bring suit to enforce WARN. 3 However, a union must still
satisfy the minimal requirements for constitutional standing.
Federal courts initially struggled with the issue of a
union's standing to sue on behalf of the workers it represents.
The conventional three-prong test for associational standing
requires proof that (1) e organization's members would
otherwise have standing to sue on their own behalf, (2) the
interests which the organization seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose, and (3) neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members. 4 Because WARN claims are for
monetary relief that may vary from individual to individual,
some courts held that unions did not have standing because
they could not satisfy the third prong.
The Supreme Court resolved the dispute by holding that a
union may assert associational standing under WARN by
[Section 10:2)
1The DOL regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 639.1 et seq. They
have been held to have the force and effect of law. Washington v. Aircap
Industries Corp., 831 F. Supp. 1292, 8 1.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1290 (D.S.C.
1993); In re Mr. Goodbuys of New York Corp., Inc., 164 B.R. 24, 30 Collier
Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1487, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 394, 128 Lab, Cas. (CCH)
~ 11171 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1994).
When evaluating a plant closing or mass layoff under WARN, it is
often essential to consult the legislative history of the Act. The National
Lawyers Guild Maurice and Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic and
Social Justice has prepared a digest of the legislative history as well as a
number of publications addressing the WARN Act, corporate welfare and
environmental justice, More information can be obtained from the Center
at http://www.sugarlaw.org or at Guild Law Center, 733 St. Antoine, 3rd
Floor, Detroit, Michigan 48226, (313) 962-6540 (telephone), (313) 962-4492
(fax).

29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(5).
29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(5), Local governmental units may also sue to
enforce their rights to notice.
4Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com'n, 432 U.S. 333,
343, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1977).
2
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satisfying the first two prongs alone. 5 It held that the third
prong was a judicially fashioned limitation, rather than a
constitutional requirement, and that Congress could abrogate
it, as it did in WARN. 6
The rights that WARN creates are in addition to those
contractual and statutory rights that workers, their unions,
and local governments enjoy.7 Thus, for instance, the violation of a longer notification period contained in a collective
bargaining agreement is not affected by WARN. In fact, the
statute and the DOL's regulations provide that the WARN
notice period runs concurrently with the longer notice period
provided in the collective bargaining agreement. 8
§ 10:3

Definition of employer under WARN: The
"business enterprise"

WARN defines an "employer" as a "business enterprise." 1
5United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown
Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 116 S. Ct. 1529, 134 L. Ed. 2d 758, 11 1.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 1057, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2193, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11556
(1996).
6The Court noted that "the third prong of the associational standing
test is best seen as focusing on . . . matters of administrative convenience
and efficiency, not on elements of a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution." United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 116 S. Ct. 1529, 134 L. Ed. 2d
758, 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1057, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2193, 131 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 11556 (1996).
7 29 U.S.C.A. § 2105.
8 29 U.S.C.A. § 2105; 20 C.F.R. § 639.l(g).
[Section 10:3]
1Generally, federal, state and local governments, along with federally
recognized Indian tribe governments, are exempt from WARN coverage.
20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a). The regulation goes on to provide, however, that "the
term 'employer' includes public and quasi-public entities which engage in
business (i.e., take part in a commercial or industrial enterprise, supply a
service or good on a mercantile basis, or provide independent management of public assets, raising revenue and making desired investments),
and which are separately organized from the regular government, which
have their own governing bodies, and which have independent authority
to manage their personnel and assets." These regulations can be found at
http://www.access.gpo.govnaracfrwaisidx__0220cfr639_02.htm1. See also
Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees Intern. Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Associates, 724 F. Supp. 333, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 958, 132
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3025, 114 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11867 (D.N.J. 1989).
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The statute's use of the phrase "business enterprise" has led
some courts to preclude direct liability for individuals who
are owners or officers of a company2 and, in one instance, to
exclude a bankrupt debtor in possession who is liquidating
its business from coverage under the Act. 3 On the other hand,
sole proprietors 4 and partners in a partnership are covered. 5
Alter ego corporations and individuals should also be
covered. 6 The DOL's regulations likewise provide for
multiple-defendant liability when the nature of the relationship between entities is such that the legal fiction of inde2See, e.g., Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192, 8, 8 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 581, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10788 (E.D. Mich. 1993);
Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 297, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1377, 120 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) f 11074, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10034 (E.D. La. 1991), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127
Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 11024 (5th Cir. 1994); Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc., 778
F. Supp. 605, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1441, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10060
(E.D. N.Y. 1991).
3In re United Healthcare System, Inc., 200 F.3d 170, 15, 35 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 105, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1470, 140 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10628
(3d Cir. 1999). At least one other court has held, however, that the issue
of liquidation for a debtor in possession is irrelevant and may not be used
to escape WARN liability. In re Reilly, 235 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1999). This analysis is sounder because there is no statutory support for
an additional exemption from WARN for bankrupt employers.
4Marques v. Telles Ranch, Inc., 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 355, 1994 WL
392232, 10 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
5 International Alliance of Theatrical Employees and Moving Picture
Mach. Operators of U.S. and Canada, Local 683, Laboratory Film, Video
Technicians, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 929, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10567, 1990
WL 282613 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
6 Watson v. Michigan Industrial Holdings, No. 97-CV-76034 (E.D.
Mich. 1999); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192, 8 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 581, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10788 (E.D. Mich. 1993). See also
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America Local 157 v. OEM/Erie Westland, LLC., 203 F. Supp. 2d 825
(E.D. Mich. 2002); Barber v. New Deiphos Mfg. Co., No. 3:91CV7610 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (recovery in settlement of alter-ego allegations against individual who was sole shareholder of company). One court has, however,
rejected this notion, apparently ignoring the distinction between direct
employer and derivative alter-ego liability. Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc., 778
F. Supp. 605, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1441, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10060
(E.D. N.Y. 1991).
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pendence may properly be disregarded. 7 The regulations
provide that:
[S] ome of the factors to be considered in making this determination are (i) common ownership, (ii) common directors
and or officers, (iii) de facto exercise of control, (iv) unity of
personnel policies emanating from a common source, and (v)
the dependency of operations.

In essence, the DOL has codified some of the many factors
employed by courts in traditional "alter ego" and "single
employer" analyses. This parity has caused some courts to
apply multifaceted and often complex and overlapping tests
to determine whether a parent is liable for the WARN Act
violations of its subsidiary. 8 At least one court, however,
rejected traditional single-employer analyses because of the
overlap, and instead adopted a unified approach that focuses
on the existence or absence of an arm's length relationship
found among unintegrated companies. 9
Similarly, in imposing liability on the parent in Local 397,
IUE v. Midwest Fasteners, the court focused primarily on
the parent's de facto control over its subsidiary and, in particular, the fact that it was the parent's decision to close the
subsidiary. 10 Thus, even though the corporate parties strictly
adhered to the corporate formalities, "the true wrongdoer
720 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2). One court has distinguished this test from
that used to determine "employer" liability under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, so that a finding of no "single employer" liability under
WARN does not preclude litigation of employer liability against the same
entity under FELA. Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Burlington
Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., 210 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 2000).
8See, e.g., United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Alden Con·ugated Container Corp., 901 F. Supp. 426, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
1700, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11419 (D. Mass. 1995) (applying three forms
of alter ego single-employer test).
91nternational Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers, General Truck Drivers, Office Food & Warehouse Local 952 v.
American Delivery Service Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 770, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
801, 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2841, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11299 (9th Cir.
1995) ("It seems unduly complicated to check off five different tests under
five different headings when each test overlaps considerably and the basic
point of the inquiry is clear: has [defendant 1] structured its relationship
with [defendant 2] in such a fashion as to control [defendant 2] and, at the
same time, avoid [defendant l's] obligations under federal law?").
10Local 397, Intern. Union of Electronic, Elec. Salaried Mach. and
Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 779 F. Supp.

©
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(the parent) should not escape liability.m 1
"Single employer" liability may also extend beyond the
traditional parent-subsidiary relationship. One court has
held that a corporate partner of an employer who closes a
plant may also be liable as the employer under WARN. 12
Similarly, when a secured lender exerts significant control
over the borrower, it may be held liable to the borrower's
employees under WARN. 13
When a trustee or conservator is appointed to run a business, the business owners remain the "employer" for the
purposes of complying with WARN. 14 It appears, however,
that a conservator may be held liable if he or she takes over
the day-to-day operations of the facility, although the conservator may be covered by the exception for governmental
action. 15
In the event of a sale of a business, the seller has a legal
obligation to give notice if the closing or layoff occurs anytime
788, 7 I.E.R. Oas. (BNA) 65, 121 Lab. Oas. (OCH)~ 10125 (D.N.J. 1992).
See also Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) , cert.
den. 516 U.S. 869 (1995) (fact that parent does not actually hire employees or participate in purchasing services or merchandise for subsidiary
may not negate question of centralized control if pai·ent forms decision to
close plant).
11 Local 397, Intern. Union of Electronic, Elec. Salaried Mach. and
Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 779 F. Supp.
788, 800, 7 I.E.R. Oas. (BNA) 65, 121 Lab. Oas. (OCH) ~ 10125 (D.N.J.
1992).
12 lnternational Alliance of Theatrical Employees and Moving Picture
Mach. Operators of U.S. and Canada, Local 683, Laboratory Film, Video
Technicians, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 929, 118 Lab. Cas. (OCH)~ 10567, 1990
WL 282613 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
13See Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269, 11 I.E.R. Oas. (BNA)
1437, 132 Lab. Oas. (OCH) ~ 11617 (8th Cir. 1996); Chauffeurs, Sales
Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 572, Intern. Broth. of
Teamsters, AFL-CIO v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241, 10 I.E.R. Oas. (BNA)
1697, 130 Lab. Oas. (OCH)~ 11411 (9th Cir. 1995); Pearson v. Component
Technology Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 510, 15 I.E.R. Oas. (BNA) 1704, 140
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10663 (W.D. Pa. 1999).
14Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees Intern. Union Local 54 v.
Elsinore Shore Associates, 724 F. Supp. 333, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 958, 132
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3025, 114 Lab. Oas. (OCH) ~ 11867 (D.N.J. 1989).
15Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees Intern. Union Local 54 v.
Elsinore Shore Associates, 724 F. Supp. 333, 5 I.E.R. Oas. (BNA) 958, 132
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3025, 114 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11867 (D.N.J. 1989). See
also Britt v. Gusdorf Corp., CA., No.4:93CV1813 (JCH) (E.D. Mo. 1994).
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up to and including the moment of sale. 16 Thereafter, the
buyer is responsible for providing notice. 17 This language
does not, however, require the buyer to actually hire the
seller's employees. 18
This provision has been interpreted to exempt employers
from notice responsibilities when the employees have
continued to work for the buyer without an interruption in
employment. In Headrick v. Rockwell International Corp.,
the transferee of assets agreed to assume the transferor's liability, with the expectation that the facility would be operated with the former employees. 19 Nonetheless, the court
held that no employment loss occurred because neither the
sale of a business nor wage or benefit reductions imposed
thereafter are WARN events. Thus, while the court agreed
that the WARN Act assigns liability for providing notice of a
closing or mass layoff after the sale to the purchaser, it found
that Congress' intention was that a sale itself should not
trigger the Act. 20 In the context of an acquisition, the acquiring corporation and the acquired corporation may both be
treated as an employer. 21
16 29

U.S.C.A. § 2101(b).
U.S.C.A. § 2101(b). Accordingly, unless the buyer and seller arrange for jointly authorized presale notice, the buyer must wait 60 days to
shut down.
18See 20 C.F.R. § 639.4(c).
19Headrick v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 18 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1522, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 865, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.
2d (BNA) 57, 128 Lab. Cas. (CCR)~ 11149 (10th Cir. 1994).
20 See also International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Mach. Operators, AFL-CIO v. Compact Video
Services, Inc., 50 F.3d 1464, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 612, 129 Lab. Cas.
(CCR) ~ 11296 (9th Cir. 1995) (denying recovery where employees were
rehired by purchasing company but suffered pay cuts and loss of benefits).
The court's conclusion regarding Congressional intention appears
misguided when one considers that changes in wages and benefits
implemented by the new employer may have, in fact, constituted a
constructive discharge.
21 Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 663, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 609, 123 Lab. Cas.
(CCR) ~ 10355 (E.D. La. 1992), order amended, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 799
(E.D. La. 1992) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d
1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11024 (5th Cir.
1994).
17 29

©
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§ 10:4

-Number of employees
To be covered by WARN, the employer must employ either
(1) 100 or more employees, not counting part-time employees,1 or (2) 100 or more employees who work, in the aggregate, 4,000 hours per week exclusive of overtime. 2 To satisfy
the 100-employee threshold requirement, one may look at
the entire corporate family. Employees at parent, sibling,
subsidiary, and other affiliated companies may be counted
toward meeting this threshold number. 3 Employees of an independent contractor are not counted. 4
Workers on temporary layoff or leave who have a reasonable expectation of recall as of the date of the plant closing
are counted as employees. 5 The test for determining whether
employees have a reasonable expectation of recall is whether
they understand through notification or industry practice
that their employment has only been temporarily
interrupted. 6 In Damron v. Rob Fork Mining,7 the court ruled
that plaintiffs who were on layoff for eight to ten years had
no reasonable expectation of recall. Courts have also required
that the expectation must be that the employee would be
[Section 10:4]
129 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(l)(A). The exclusion of part-time employees, for
purposes· of counting employees under this section, eliminates both employees who are "employed for an average of fewer than 20 hours per
week" and those who have "been employed for fewer than 6 of the 12
months preceding the date on which notice is required." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 2101(a)(8).
The regulations provide that the period to be used for calculating
whether a worker has worked "an average of fewer than 20 hours per
week" is the shorter of the actual time the worker has been employed or
the most recent 90 days. Obviously an employee who has worked less than
90 days in total will be excluded by the second prong of the definition of
"part-time employee."
229 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(l)(B). Employees who average less than 20
hours a week and recent hires, who would not be counted under Section
2101(a)(l)(A), are counted under Section 29 U.S.C.A. § 210l(a)(l)(B).
3 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(3)-(4) and (e).
4 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2).
5 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a). Kildea v. Electro Wire Products, Inc., 792 F.
Supp. 1046, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 766, 123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 10390 (E.D.
Mich. 1992).
6 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a).
7Damron v. Rob Fork Min. Corp., 945 F.2d 121, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
1448, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 10942 (6th Cir. 1991).
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recalled to the same or a similar job. 8
§ 10:5

Plant closing or mass layoff defined: Number
of affected employees
Once the 100-employee requirement has been met, the
next question is whether a covered "plant closing" or "mass
layoff" has occurred. A plant closing is defined as "the permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more facilities or operating units within a
single site of employment if the shutdown results in an
employment loss . . . for 50 or more employees." 1 A "mass
layoff'' occurs when, at a single site of employment (1) 50 or
more employees suffer an employment loss and (2) these
discharged employees either constitute 33 percent or more of
all full-time employees at the single site, or number 500 or
more. 2
All employees terminated after the shutdown is ordered
are entitled to notice, irrespective of whether they are
terminated immediately and others work for some portion of
the 60-day notice period. 3 Only plant closings that result in
an employment loss for 50 or more full-time workers at the
single site of employment during any 30-day period are
actionable. 4
Part-time employees are not counted in meeting any of
these threshold numbers of affected employees. 5 The definition of a part-time employee has produced anomalous and
8Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1276, 6 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 732, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10559 (E.D. Tenn. 1990); Finnan v. L.F.
Rothschild & Co., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 460, 4 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1734 (S.D.
N.Y. 1989); Finkler v. Elsinore Shore Associates, 725 F. Supp. 828, 4
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 973, 113 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 11800 (D.N.J. 1989).
[Section 10:5)
129 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(2).
2 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(3)(A) and (B). Kildea v. Electro Wire Products,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1014, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1575, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
~ 11067, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10124 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
3 United Mine Workers of America v. Martinka Coal Co., 202 F.3d 717,
15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1729, 140 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10634 (4th Cir. 2000).
4 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(2).
5 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(2); 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), (II), and (ii).
A part-time employee is considered one "employed for an average of fewer
than 20 hours per week or who has been employed for fewer than 6 of the
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unfair results by excluding recent permanent hires in meeting the threshold requirements for either a plant closing or
mass layoff. 6
Special attention should be paid to plant closings and mass
layoffs involving bumping rights, which may cause an
otherwise unlawful plant closing to be exempt under WARN.
For example, in Harman Mining7 the defendant eliminated
57 positions at one of its mines. Fourteen of these terminated
employees exercised their bumping rights under a collective
bargaining agreement, bumping fourteen employees at the
defendant's second mine. The court held that there was no
WARN violation, because only 43 employees experienced an
employment loss at the first mine.
Employment losses in a 30-day period are always added
together in determining whether either a "plant closing" or
"mass layoff'' has occurred. As the DOL's regulations explain,
the employer must consider employment losses in both a 30day and a 90-day period to determine whether a 60-day notice is required. 8 Aggregation of "groups" of layoffs is not
necessary when each layoff exceeds threshold numbers or
when a plant closing takes place in stages, each one of which
involves the termination of over 50 employees.'>
12 months preceding the date on which notice is required." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 210l(a)(8). This calculation is determined by the actual time of employ-

ment or the most recent 90 days, whichever is shorter. 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(h).
6Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 809,
118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10649 (D. Minn. 1990), the defendant hired over
300 workers between January and May of 1989, after receiving a contract
from Kodak. When the contract was subsequently canceled in May, the
defendant laid off these new employees with no WARN notice. Since they
had only been employed for less than five months, the court held that no
WARN violation existed.
7United Mine Workers Intern., Dist. 28 v. Harman Min. Corp., 780 F.
Supp. 375, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 75, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10120 (W.D. Va.
1991).
8 20 C.F.R. § 639.5.
9United Mine Workers of America Intern. Union v. Martinka Coal Co.,
45 F. Supp. 2d 521, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 555 (N.D. W. Va. 1999), affd,
202 F.3d 717, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1729, 140 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10634
(4th Cir. 2000).
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When two or more small groups 10 of employment losses occur over a 90-day period at the same site, neither of which
alone amounts to a plant closing or mass layoff, WARN allows for aggregation to meet the threshold numbers. 11 An
employer can escape application of this provision by proving
that the employment losses sought to be aggregated have
separate and distinct causes, and were not an attempt to
evade WARN. 12 One cannot aggregate separate groups of
layoffs when at least one group meets the requirements for a
plant closing or mass layoff. 13
If enough employees have been terminated to constitute a
WARN violation, recall by the employer of a sufficient
number of employees within six months of termination can
undo the violation. In Electro Wire Products, 14 for example,
the court held that even though the defendant's layoff of 53
of its 153 employees was a mass layoff under WARN, the
10 "Groups" means every employee who lost his or her job within the 90day period. Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 16
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 833, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10765 (5th Cir. 2000).
11 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(d). See Roquet v. Arthur Anderson LLP, 19 I.E.R.
Cas. CBNA) 1808, 2003 WL 21251979 (N.D. Ill. 2003); United Auto. Aerospace & Agr. Implement of America, Local 1077 v. Shadyside Stamping
Corp., 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1640, 1991 WL 340191, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, Local 7-515, AFL-CIO v.
American Home Products Corp., 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 323, 121 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 10159, 1991 WL 342379, 7 (N.D. Ind. 1991); International Ass'n
of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, Shopman's Local 620
v. Lee C. Moore Corp., 117 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10424, 1990 WL 252274
(N.D. Okla. 1990); Tomko v. Emery Worldwide Delivery, C.A. No. 91-1449
(W.D. Pa. 1991).
12 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(a)(10) (ii); see, e.g., Hollowell v. Orleans Regional
Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 16 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 833, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
~ 10765 (5th Cir. 2000) (defendant could not prove "separate and distinct"
causes when it could not demonstrate that separate rounds of layoffs were
"wholly unrelated" to an ensuing plant shutdown).
13 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(d). See Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F.
Supp. 1276, 1284, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 732, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10559
(E.D. Tenn. 1990); United Auto. Aerospace & Agr. Implement of America,
Local 1077 v. Shadyside Stamping Corp., 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1640, 1991
WL 340191, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1991); United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of
America (UE) v. Maxim, Inc., 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 629, 115 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 10077, 1990 WL 66578, 5 (D. Mass. 1990); Cruz v. Robert Abbey,
Inc., 6 I.E.R. Cas. CBNA) 1225, 116 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10323, 1990 WL
84349, 6 (E.D. N.Y. 1990).
14 Kildea v. Electro Wire Products, Inc., 775 F.Supp. 1014 (E.D. Mich.
1991).
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recall of six of the 53 employees within six months negated
any WARN violation because the layoff then totaled less
than the requisite threshold of at least 50 employees who
constitute at least one-third of the full-time workforce. 15
However, in Cruz v. Robert Abbey, 18 the court held that material questions were raised about whether the employer
was trying to evade the numerical predicates of WARN in a
case in which the defendant, within a 90-day period, laid off
employees, recalled them after the suit was filed, then laid
them off again.
An extension of layoffs originally announced to last six
months or less is considered an employment loss, except in
one instance. 17 An extension beyond six months that is
caused by business circumstances unforeseeable at the time
of the initial layoff is not treated as an employment loss, as
long as notice is given when it does become reasonably foreseeable that an extension beyond six months is required. 18
In certain circumstances, an employee transfer is not
treated as an employment loss. 19 This occurs if, prior to a
closing or layoff resulting from a company's relocation or
consolidation20 of part or all of its business, (1) the employee
is offered a transfer to another site of employment21 owned
by the employer that is within a reasonable commuting
distance, 22 with no more than a six-month break in employ15Kildea v. Electro Wire Products, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1014, 6 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1575, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 111067, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 110124
(E.D. Mich. 1991).
18Cruz v. Robert Abbey, Inc., 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1225, 116 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 1 10323, 1990 WL 84349, 6 (E.D. N.Y. 1990).
1729 U.S.C.A. § 2102(c).
18 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(c)(l), (2).
1929 U.S.C.A. § 2101(b)(2)(A) and (B).
20 The consolidation or relocation must be the cause of the plant closing
or mass layoff, not the result. Johnson v. TeleSpectrum Worldwide, Inc.,
61 F. Supp. 2d 116, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 750 (D. Del. 1999).
21 The employer bears the burden of proof on this affirmative defense
and must show, inter alia, that a bona fide offer of guaranteed further
employment was made. Johnson v. TeleSpectrum Worldwide, Inc., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 116, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 750 (D. Del. 1999).
22The DOL has adopted the IRS definition of reasonable commuting
distance, ruling that its meaning will vary according to local and industry
conditions. The several factors to be considered in determining whether
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ment; or (2) an employee accepts, within 30 days, 23 an offer
of transfer to another site of employment, regardless of the
commuting distance, with no more than a six-month break
in employment. 24
Employees who voluntarily quit prior to actual termination are not counted in determining whether the threshold
number is met unless there is evidence of coercion, a hostile
or intolerable work environment, undue pressure by the
employer, or similar circumstances. 25
§

10:6 -The single site requirement

Geographic connection or proximity is generally required
for a finding of a "single site" of employment. 1 However,
unconnected and only reasonably proximate facilities should
be considered a single site if they make similar products,
share a workforce, or otherwise share the same operational
purpose. 2
the commuting distance is reasonable are: (1) usual travel time, (2) customarily available transportation, (3) quality of roads, and (4) geographic
accessibility of place of work. 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(3). At least one court has
held that the reasonable commuting distance is to be measured from employees' homes, not where the plant is located. Johnson v. TeleSpectrum
Worldwide, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 116, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 750 (D. Del.
1999).
23 The employee must accept the offer either within 30 days of receiving
it, or within 30 days of the layoff or closing, whichever is later. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 210l(b)(2)(B).
24 29 U.S.C.A. § 210Hb)(2)(A) and (B).
25Johnson v. Telespectrum Worldwide, Inc., 29 Fed. Appx. 76, 2002, 19
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1216, 145 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1! 11228, 146 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 1! 10102 (3d Cir. 2002).
[Section 10:6]
1"A single site of employment can refer to either a single location or a
group of contiguous locations. Groups or structures which form a campus
or industrial park, or separate facilities across the street from one another, may be considered a single site of employment." 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.30(i)(l).
2 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(3). See, e.g., Carpenters Dist. Council of New
Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1! 11024 (5th Cir. 1994) (two plants
in different locations deemed "inextricably connected" because workers
had been moved from one to another due to overcrowding and continued
to perform the same jobs); Hooper v. Polychrome, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 1111,
@
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The DOL intended this provision to be construed narrowly. 3
The courts have complied, a few relying on a judicially created presumption against a single-site finding in cases of
noncontiguous facilities. 4 Thus, geographical proximity is
almost always the touchstone, particularly when the distance
between the two sites is somewhat significant. 5 Moreover,
"same operational purpose" has been interpreted by a few
courts more broadly than simply meaning the production of
the same product; other criteria showing integration of
operations have been required as well. 8
The DOL has likewise adopted a "common sense" definition of the terms "facility or operating unit" used to define a
11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 746, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11550 (D. Kan. 1996)
(intermittent migration of workforce from one site to another is not sufficient to meet "same operational purpose" requirements if different duties
are performed at each site).
354 Fed Reg 16049 (1989).
4Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 765, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1473,
130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11413 (10th Cir. 1995); Dwyer v. Galen Hosp.
Illinois, Inc., 1996 WL 111886 (N.D. Ill. 1996); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local No. 72 v. Giant Markets, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 700,
706, 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1300, 132 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11604 (M.D. Pa.
1995).
6Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930, 9 I.E.R. Cas, (BNA)
1103, 128 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11150, 29 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 812 (5th Cir.
1994) (sites across town); Hooper v. Polychrome, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 1111,
11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 746, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11550 (D. Kan. 1996)
(sites 27 miles apart); Moore v. On-Line Software Intern. Inc., 8 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 1089, 1993 WL 189753 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (several different sites
at different locations, owned by same purchasing company). At least one
court has been particularly hostile toward this concept. International
Union, United Mine Workers v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 8
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1601, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10915 (11th Cir. 1993)
(finding that none of defendant's four mine sites could be considered
together as "single site" despite fact that three of four were geographically
contiguous, two mines were connected underground, and employer's
central office exercised some control over each site, because each mine has
its own complement of employees, there was generally no rotation among
sites, and each mine's management team has operational responsibility).
8Rifkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 11 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 741, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11510 (8th Cir. 1996); International
Union, United Mine Workers v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 8
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1601, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10915 (11th Cir. 1993).
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"plant closing.m Plant closures may also occur in entities
that do not operate within structures or buildings, e.g.,
fanning/harvesting operations, even though a plot of land
may not be a plant in the literal sense of the word. For employees who are "out-stationed," i.e., required to travel from
point to point, or whose duties regularly take them outside
the employer's facilities, "the single site of employment to
which they are assigned as their home base, from which
their work is assigned, or to which they report will be the
single site in which they are covered for WARN purposes."8
When none of the aforementioned single-site criteria apply,
a single site of employment may be found to exist in "truly
unusual organizational situations. 9
"Affected employees" may be found beyond the single site
of employment. In Kirkvold v. Dakota Pork Industries, 10 the
court held that employees of related and geographically
proximate corporations were "affected" for the purposes of
WARN if they reasonably could be expected to experience an
employment loss as a result of the plant closing. They also
must be identifiable at the time of the closing. The court was
not persuaded by the defendants' argument that only the
employees at the single site that triggered WARN were affected, finding that the "determination of what constitutes a
'single site of employment' is pertinent only to calculating
whether a sufficient number of employees suffered an
employment loss."
The defense that no single site of employment exists may
be waived by a defendant. In Castro v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 11 the court held that defense counsel's letter stating that the defendant "will not be proceeding with the single
site defense" barred the defendant from later raising the is7"The term 'facility' refers to a building or buildings. The term 'operating unit' refers to an organizationally or operationally distinct product,
operation, or specific work function within or across facilities at the single
site." 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(j).
8 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(6).
9 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(8). See, e.g., Carpenters Dist. Council of New
Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994); Dwyer v.
Galen Hosp. Illinois, Inc., 1996 WL 111886 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
10 Kirkvold v. Dakota Pork Industries, Inc., 97 Civ 4166 (D.S.D. 1997).
11 Castro v. Chicago Housing Authority, 19 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 307, 2002
WL 31324053 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
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sue at trial.
§ 10:7

Requirement of employment loss
WARN does not apply to all employment losses that occur
as a result of a covered mass layoff or plant closing. Instead.
it defines an actionable employment loss as "an employment
termination, other than a discharge for cause, voluntary
departure, or retirement; a layoff exceeding 6 months; or a
reduction in hours of work of more than 50 percent during
each month of any six-month period." 1 This definition is
subject to several exceptions and qualifications.
In Dillard Department Stores, 2 for example, the defendant
argued that because one terminated class member refused
the continued employment offered her, she did not suffer an
"employment loss." The employee maintained that the
employment offered her was substantially different from her
former work in pay and function, thus amounting to a
constructive discharge. The DOL regulations specifically allow a constructive discharge to be treated as an "employment loss," although they do not define the term "constructive discharge." 3 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument
and found that a reasonable person would not find the new
job offer "so difficult or unpleasant as to feel compelled to
resign,"4 even though it carried more responsibility and different functions, required twenty more hours a week, and
had the same pay as the former position.
Whether an employee finds subsequent employment
elsewhere is irrelevant in determining whether he or she
[Section 10:7]
129 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a)(6); 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(f).
2 Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 663, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 609, 123 Lab. Cas.
(CCR) ,r 10355 (E.D. La. 1992), order amended, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 799
(E.D. La. 1992) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d
1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCR) 1111024 (5th Cir.
1994).
3 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(b)(2).
4Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 663, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 609, 123 Lab. Cas.
(CCR) ,r 10355 (E.D. La. 1992), order amended, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 799
(E.D. La. 1992) and aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d
1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCR) ,r 11024 (5th Cir.
1994).
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suffered an "employment loss. "6
§ 10:8

Notice requirements
Once a WARN "event" is established, notice is to be given
to representatives 1 of the "affected employees," the "affected
employees" themselves if no representative exists, the "chief
elected official of the unit of local government,2 and the state
dislocated workers unit. 3 Each of these persons or entities,
except for the state dislocated worker unit, has a statutory
remedy if the employer fails to provide proper notice. 4
The content, form and method of delivery differ slightly
according to which of the three receives notice. 6 Notice to the
employee representative must identify the site involved and
the company official who can be contacted, say whether the
action is permanent or temporary, provide a schedule of
separations, and identify the affected workers. 6
If the affected employees are unrepresented, then notice
must be given to individual workers. WARN provides that
8Hotel Employees, Restaurant Employees Intern. Union v. Raroc, Inc.,
16 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 56, 2000 WL 204537, 16 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
[Section 10:8]
1WARN defines a "representative" as an exclusive representative of
employees within the meaning of section 9(a) or 8(f) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a), 158(f), or section 2 of the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(a)(4). The 1·egulations
specify that the representatives of "affected employees" who are entitled
to notice are "the chief elected officer of the exclusive representative(s) or
bargaining agent(s) of affected employees." 20 C.F.R. § 639.6(a). The
regulations go on to recommend that notice also be given to local union officials if the chief elected officer of the exclusive representative is someone
other than the officer of the local union representing the affected
employees.
2WARN defines a "unit of local government" as "any general purpose
political subdivision of a State which has the power to levy taxes, and
spend funds, as well as general corporate and police powers." 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 210l(a)(7). Exactly who is the "chief elected official of the unit of local
government" is not readily discernible from this definition, since a business could be located in more than one "unit of local government." The
DOL has resolved this by requiring that notice be given to the "unit" to
which the employer has directly paid the most taxes. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(g).
329 U.S.C.A. § 2102(a)(l), (2).
429 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(l) and (4).
620 C.F.R. § 639.7; 20 C.F.R. § 639.8.
6 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(c).
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"affected employees" are those "employees who may reasonably be expected to experience an employment loss as a consequence of a proposed plant closing or mass layoff by their
employer."7 The employer must give notice to both full- and
part-time incumbent employees who might be affected, 8 and
to laid-off employees with a reasonable expectation of recall
whose recall rights would be limited or eliminated. 9 Bumpees,
even at separate work sites, are considered "affected employees" entitled to notice to the extent that they can reasonably
be identified at the time notice is required. 10
The state dislocated workers unit and chief elected official
must receive essentially all of the information provided to
workers and their representatives. 11 However, the employer
has the option of providing them with an abbreviated notice
if it keeps complete information on-site. 12 Failure to make
this information readily accessible and available upon
request is treated as a failure to give notice. 13
Managerial and supervisory employees are entitled to notice; business partners are not. 14 Consultants and contract
employees who have a separate employment relationship
with another employer from whom they receive their pay, or
who are self-employed, are not "affected employees." 15
7 29

U.S.C.A. § 210l(a)(5).
C.F.R. 639.6(b) provides: "While part-time employees are not
counted in determining whether plant closing or mass layoff thresholds
are reached, such workers are due notice."
9Damron v. Rob Fork Min. Corp., 945 F.2d 121, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
1448, 120 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10942 (6th Cir. 1991); Kildea v. Electro Wire
Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 1046, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 766, 123 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 10390 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Carpenters Dist. Council of New
Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 663, 7
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 609, 123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10355 (E.D. La. 1992), order
amended, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 799 (E.D. La. 1992) and afl'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc.,
748 F. Supp. 1276, 1284-1285, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 732, 118 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 10559 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
1020 C.F.R. § 639.3(e).
11 29 U.S.C.A. § 2101(a); 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(e).
12 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(f).
13 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(f).
14 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(e).
15 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(e).
8 20
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Notice must be in writing. 16 The DOL has prescribed by
regulation the form, content, and method of delivery. 17
An employer is only required to provide notice based on
the best information available at the time notice is given. 18
Minor or inadvertent inaccuracies or errors resulting from
subsequent changes in circumstances will not violate
WARN. 19
A number of courts have, however, found that the defects
in the employer's notice were serious enough to render it
legally tantamount to no notice at all. 20 Although an
16 29

U.S.C.A. § 2102(a).
20 C.F.R. § 639.7, 639.8.
18 20 C.F.R. § 639. 7( 4).
19 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(4).
20 See, e.g., Joe v. First Bank System, Inc., 202 F.3d 1067, 15 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1734 (8th Cir. 2000) (incomplete information in newsletters and
posted notices insufficient); Kalwaytis v. Preferred Meal Systems, Inc., 78
F.3d 117, 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 833, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) il 11517 (3d Cir.
1996) (letter stating that company would be contracting out work to another company, that other company had immediate offer of employment,
and that letter was itself notice of layoff to occur in future was defective);
Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 858 F. Supp. 1081, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 513 (D.
Colo. 1994), order aft'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 61 F.3d
757, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1473, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ii 11413 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. dismissed, 517 U.S. 1182, 116 S. Ct. 1588, 134 L. Ed. 2d 685,
12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 160 (1996) (two memoranda defective because first
only gave veiled reference to layoff and second announced that some employees would be laid off but gave no details); Washington v. Aircap
Industries Corp., 831 F. Supp. 1292, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1290 (D.S.C.
1993) (notice of normal seasonal layoff inadequate); Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers Intern. Union, Local 7-515, AFL-CIO v. American Home
Products Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1441, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 673, 125 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) f 10653 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (notice defective because it failed to
provide sufficient specificity regarding dates, and company failed to renew
it after 60 days had expired); United Auto. Aerospace & Agr. Implement
of America, Local 1077 v. Shadyside Stamping Corp., 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
1640, 1991 WL 340191, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (multiple policies announcing
layoffs without specific dates or names were inadequate); United Elec.,
Radio and Mach. Workers of America (UE) v. Maxim, Inc., 5 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 629, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 10077, 1990 WL 66578, 5 CD. Mass.
1990) (notice defective regardless of when it was given because it lacked
required specificity and was given to wrong employee representative).
But see Saxion v. Titan-C-Manufacturing, Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 11, 11
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1321, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 11589, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
919, 1996 FED App. 0159P (6th Cir. 1996) (technical deficiencies not sufficient to negate notice); Marques v. Telles Ranch, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1438,
17
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employer is allowed to give incomplete notice more than 60
days in advance of a covered plant closing or mass layoff, adequate and complete notice must be given at least 60 days in
advance of the action, 21 The method of delivery is also a
proper consideration when assessing sufficiency, 22
Once an employer has given notice under WARN, it may
postpone the action announced by giving additional notice.
The requirements for additional notice are as follows:
(1) the postponement must be less than 60 days, or else new
notice is required, (2) the additional notice must be provided
'as soon as possible,' (3) the notice must be given to all of the
parties who are regularly supposed to receive notice under
WARN, (4) the notice must contain the date to which the action has been postponed and the reasons for the postponement, and (5) the notice must be given in a manner which
will provide the notice to all affected employees. 23

The requirement that the additional notice must be
provided "as soon as possible" has been interpreted as meaning when the events that determine the timing of the relocation become foreseeable, not when they are absolute
certainties. 24 Failure to timely provide the additional notice
may result in WARN Act liability. 25
Conditional notice is permitted, but not mandatory. 26
Conditional notice is encouraged when an event is definite
and the consequence of its occurrence or nonoccurrence will
necessarily result, "in the normal course of business," in a
9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1798, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCR)~ 11528 (N.D. Cal. 1994),
judgment aff'd, 131 F.3d 1331, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 975 (9th Cir. 1997)
and aff'd in part, 133 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 1997) (notice letting employees
know that they would not be rehired, that there were no issues of bumping rights, and how to contact employer for more information constituted
adequate notice despite minor deviations from prescribed contents).
21 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(2).
22 United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers of America (UE) v. Maxim,
Inc., 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 629, 115 Lab. Cas. (CCR) ~ 10077, 1990 WL
66578, 5 (D. Mass. 1990) (notice defective due to lack of specificity and
delivery to wrong employee representative).
23 20 C.F.R. § 639.10.
24 20 C.F.R. § 639.10.
25Local 1239, Intern. Broth. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers v. Allsteel, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 78, 12
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 884 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
28 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(3).
10-22

THE

WARN AcT

§ 10:9

covered plant closing or mass layoff. 27
Delivery of notice may be in any reasonable method
designed to ensure receipt of the notice sixty days before
separation. 28 Both the statute and the DOL deem several
methods of delivery, such as inclusion in paycheck, mailing
to last known address, and personal delivery, to be
appropriate. However, ticketed or preprinted notices regularly included in paychecks or envelopes are not allowed. 29
§ 10:9

-When less than 60 days' notice is permitted

There are three exceptions to the requirement that a full
sixty days' notice be given, 1 all of which must be construed
naITowly. 2 Under each exception, the employer is required to
provide notice as soon as is practicable and to include therein
a brief explanation for the shortened notice period. 3 Failure
to meet these requirements negates the notice. 4 Under each
of the three exceptions, the employer bears the burden of
27 20 C.F.R. § 639.7(3). The DOL's regulations give, as an example of a
situation in which conditional notice is appropriate, the uncertainty over
the renewal of a major contract.
28 20 C.F.R. § 639.8.
29 29 U.S.C.A. § 2107(b); 20 C.F.R. § 639.8.

[Section 10:9]
129 U.S.C.A. § 2101(b). See, e.g., Carpenters Dist. Council of New
Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994).
2 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a) ("faltering business" exception). Although the
regulations do not specifically provide that the other two exceptions for
unforeseeable business circumstances and natural disasters must be read
narrowly, they put the burden on the employer to prove that all of the
conditions are met.
3 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(3). As soon as "practicable" may, in some circumstances, be notice after the fact, 20 C.F.R. § 639.9, and failure to give
such notice should trigger liability for the full statutory period.
4 Graphic Communications Intern. Union, Local lB v. Bureau of
Engraving, Inc., 20 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 626, 2003 WL 21639146 (D. Minn.
2003) (failure to give any notice negates defense); Alarcon v. Keller
Industries, Inc., 27 F.3d 386 (9th Cir. 1994) (statement that notice period
reduced because employer was "faltering company" insufficient); Grimmer
v. Lord, Day & Lord, 937 F.Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (merely citing generic statutory exception in notice was insufficient); United Paperworkers
Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901
F. Supp. 426, 10 I.E.R. Cas. CENA) 1700, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCR)~ 11419 (D.
Mass. 1995) (same); Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp.
@:
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showing that it meets the requirements for the particular
exception it wishes to rely upon. 5
First, WARN provides that:
An employer may order the shutdown of a single site of
employment before the conclusion of the 60-day period if as
of the time that notice would have been required the
employer was actively seeking capital or business which, if
obtained, would have enabled the employer to avoid or
postpone the shutdown and the employer reasonably and in
good faith believed that giving the notice required would
have precluded the employer from obtaining the needed
capital or business. 8

By its plain language this exception applies only to plant
closings.
To rely on this defense, the employer must: (1) be able to
identify specific actions taken to obtain capital or business at
the time notice would have been required; 8 (2) demonstrate
that it exercised "commercially reasonable business judgment in its actions; 7 (3) demonstrate that there was a realistic opportunity to obtain the financing or business sought,
which if obtained, would have been sufficient to avoid or
indefinitely postpone the shutdown; 8 and (4) objectively demonstrate that it reasonably and in good faith believed that a
potential customer or source of financing would have been
unwilling to provide the new business or capital if notice
was given. 9 The defense does not apply if the employer is
1276, 1288, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 732, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 10559 (E.D.
Tenn. 1990) (failure to provide notice as soon as practicable).
5 20 C.F.R. § 639.9.
8 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(l).
8 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a)(l). See, e.g., Burnsides v. MJ Optical, Inc., 128
F.3d 700, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 717, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1024, 136 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 1 10303 (8th Cir. 1997) (defense unavailable because employer
did not search for capital or financing at time notice was required).
7Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp. 192, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
581, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 110788 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
8United Paperwork.era Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901 F. Supp. 426, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1700,
130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 11419 (D. Mass. 1995); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a)(l)-(3).
9United Paperwork.era Intern. Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901 F. Supp. 426, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1700,
130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 11419 (D. Mass. 1995); 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a)(4).
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seeking to sell or liquidate its business operations, 10 or when
there is no causal relationship between its search for capital
and the ultimate reduction in workforce. 11
The actions of an employer relying on this defense must be
viewed in a "company-wide context." 12 Thus, a company with
access to capital markets or with cash reserves may not take
advantage of this defense by looking solely at the financial
condition of the branch, operating unit, facility, or site to be
closed. 13
The second exception to the 60-day notice period applies
when the closing or mass layoff is caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable by the
employer at the time that notice would have been required. 14
Facts that support such a finding are most often characterized by an occurrence that is caused by a sudden, dramatic,
and unexpected action or condition outside of the employer's
control. 15 By their very nature, such circumstances must
necessitate or impel the covered employment action. 16 As
with the faltering-business defense, to successfully rely on
the unforeseeable-business-circumstances defense an em10 Local 397, Intern. Union of Electronic, Elec., Salaried, Mach. and
Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 78,
6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 39, 119 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10827 (D.N.J. 1990).
11 Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994).
12 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(aJ(4).
13 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(a)(4).
14 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(2)(A).
15 See, e.g., Pena v. American Meat Pacldng Corp., 258 F. Supp. 2d 864,
19 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1862 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Jurcev v. Central Community
Hosp., 7 F.3d 618, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1505, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10908,
27 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 760 (7th Cir. 1993); Bradley v. Sequoyah Fuels Corp.,
847 F. Supp. 863, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 449 (E.D. Okla. 1994). In its regulations, the DOL cites three examples of unforeseeable business circumstances: (1) a principal client of the employer suddenly and unexpectedly
terminates a major contract with the employer; (2) a strike at a major
supplier of the employer; and (3) an unanticipated and dramatic major
economic downturn. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(b)(2).
16 Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 297, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1377, 120 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 11074, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10034 (E.D. La. 1991), aft'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994).

£

West, a Thomson business, 5/2004

10-25

§ 10:9

EMPLOYEE AND UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO LABOR LAW

ployer must give notice "as soon as is practicable.m 7
When a contract with a customer did not include a provision requiring any notice of cancellation, a cancellation by
the customer was insufficient to support this defense. 18 Moreover, although an employer must exercise commercially reasonable business judgment in predicting market demands, it
is not required to accurately predict general economic conditions that may affect demand for its products. 19 Finally, one
court has held that, given the absence of clear statutory or
regulatory language to the contrary, WARN does not require
an employer to demonstrate that it is :financially incapable of
remaining open for sixty days for the defense to apply. 20
The third exception excuses the 60-day notice requirement
in the event of a natural disaster. 21 To qualify for this exception, the employer must be able to prove that the plant closing or mass layoff was a direct result of a natural disaster. 22
The DOL regulations also provide that when the plant clos17In Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1276, 6 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 732, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110559 (E.D. Tenn. 1990), the
employer gave no notice of a plant closing that occurred as a result of the
loss of a large contract with a principal customer. The court held that
while the employer could not have reasonably foreseen the loss of its
customer 60 days before the closing, it became reasonably practical to
notify the employees up to 30 days before the closing. Therefore, although
the employer was able to avail itself of the unforeseeable-businesscircumstances defense for part of the notice period, it was still deemed liable under WARN for the 30-day balance of the violation period.
See also Wholesale and Retail Food Distribution Local 63 v. Santa Fe
Terminal Services, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 326, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 778, 126
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110860 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (delaying seven days violated
"as soon as practicable" requirement).
18International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers, General Truck Drivers, Office Food & Warehouse Local 952 v.
American Delivery Service Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 770, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
801, 148 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2841, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11 11299 (9th Cir.
1995).
19Chestnut v. Stone Forest Industries, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 932, 8 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 641, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110656 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
20Jurcev v. Central Community Hosp., 7 F.3d 618, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
1505, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11 10908, 27 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 760 (7th Cir.
1993).
21 29 U.S.C.A. § 2102(b)(2)(B).
22 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(2). Examples of such disasters provided in the
regulations include floods, earthquakes, tidal waves or tsunamis, droughts
and similar effects of nature. 20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(l).
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ing or mass layoff occurs only as an indirect result of a natural disaster, the unforeseeable-business-circumstances exception may still apply. 23 Finally, while a natural disaster may
preclude advance or full notice, "such notice as is practicable,
containing as much of the information required in [20 C.F.R.]
§ 639. 7 as is available in the circumstances of the disaster
still must be given, whether in advance or after the fact." 24
§ 10:10

-When no notice is required
In some cases no WARN notice is required. The closing of
a temporary facility does not require advance notice. 1 Notice
is also not required when the jobs being eliminated are of a
temporary nature. 2 In either case, however, the affected employees must understand at the time of hire that their
employment is temporary, and the employer has the burden
of proving that the temporary nature of the work was communicated to the employees. 3 The employer may rely on local or industrial employment practices, collective bargaining
agreements, or employment contracts to attempt to prove
that such an understanding existed. 4
If the work is otherwise permanent, providing written notice that it is temporary will not make it so. 5 If the employment is related to a specific order or contract, as in the
defense industry, deciding whether the work is temporary or
permanent depends on whether the order or contract is part
of a long-term relationship. Thus, to use an example drawn
from the DOL's regulations, if an employer who had a
contract to provide the government with a fleet of ships or
planes expected that the contract would be renewed, then
the employees hired under that contract would be permanent, not temporary. 6
23

20 C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(4).
C.F.R. § 639.9(c)(3).

24 20

[Section 10:10]
129 U.S.C.A. § 2103(1).
2 29 U.S.C.A. § 2103(1).
3 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c)(l), (2).
4 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c)(l), (2).
5 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c)(3).
6 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(c)(4).
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Employment losses resulting from strikes or lockouts7 are
not actionable under WARN-unless they are intended to
evade WARN's requirements. 8 Employers are not required to
give notice to economic strikers under the NLRA; however,
nonstriking employees at the same site may be entitled to
notice ifWARN's notice requirements are not met.9
§ 10:11

When and where to sue
Because WARN does not provide an express statute of limitations period, courts have applied the traditional rule for
borrowing the most closely analogous statute of limitations.
For years after WARN's enactment, courts were split on
whether to apply the federal limitations period of six months
under the NLRA, 1 or applicable state periods.
The Supreme Court resolved this uncertainty in 1995 in
North Star Steel. 2 The court held that WARN cases fall
squarely inside the general rule of borrowing from analogous
state statutes of limitations, not within the exception that
looks to federal law. A number of cases decided since North
Star Steel have applied state statute of limitations periods
for contract claims. 3 Other courts have borrowed state limi7According to the DOL, a lockout occurs when "for tactical or defensive
reasons during the course of collective bargaining or during a labor
dispute, an employer lawfully refuses to utilize some or all of its employees for the performance of available work." 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(d).
8 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(d).
9 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(d).
[Section 10:11]
1Although federal courts usually look to the law of the forum state to
determine what statute of limitations to apply, a narrow exception to that
rule allows borrowing from elsewhere in federal law when the arguably
relevant state limitations period would frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies or is at odds with the purpose or
operation of federal substantive law. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International
Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161, 172, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 76 L. Ed. 2d
476, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2737, 97 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110156 (1983).
2North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 115 S. Ct. 1927, 132 L.
Ed. 2d 27, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 961, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1111329 (1995).
3See, e.g., Aaron v. Brown Group, Inc., 80 F.3d 1220, 11 1.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 910, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1111567 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting equal
pay statute's six-month period and FLSA's two-year period, concluding
that five-year limitations period for all "Actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities, express or implied," should govern WARN claims);
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tations for the collection of a debt4 and wrongful discharge. 5
Given the range of results, it is wise for the practitioner in
an "undecided" jurisdiction to make the worst-case analogy
to state law and file within that limitations period.
Plaintiffs must file their action in federal court, either in
the district where the violation occurred or where the
employer transacts business. 6 Because the damages sought
under WARN are set forth in the Act and are legal in nature,
employees and their representatives have the right to trial
by jury on the issue of liability. 7
§ 10:12

Remedies

Remedies under WARN depend on who brings the action. 1
Employees bringing suit under WARN can recover up to 60
Frymire v. Ampex Corp., (:ii F.3d 757, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 117a, 1:30 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ,11111:'l (10th Cir. 1995) (applying three-year period for breach
of contract); Bell v. Philips Electronics, N.V. of the Netherlands, 897 F.
Supp. 938 (N.D. W. Va. 1995) (five-year period applicable under West Virginia law); United Mine Workers International Union v. Peabody Coal
Co., 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 271, 181 Lab. Cas. (CCII) ,111511, 1995 WL
770407, 131 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (five-year limitations period for implied
contracts).
4 Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2H5, 11 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 6, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,111479 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (Texas four-year
period for institution of action to recover debt,).
5 Luczkovich v. Melville Corp., 911 F. Supp. 208, 11 l.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
600, 131 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,111532 (E.D. Va. 1996) (one-year statute of
limitation for wrongful discharge and residual claims).
6 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(5).
7 Bentley v. Arlee Home Fashions, Inc., 861 F. Supp. G5, 9 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1473 (E.D. Ark. 1994); Wallace v. Detroit Coke Corp., 818 F. Supp.
192, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNAl 581, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,110788 (E.D. Mich.
1993); Tomko v. Emery Worldwide Delivery, CA. #91-1449 (W.D. Pa. 1993);
Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 5-92-095 LKK (E.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 54 F.3cl 1457 (9th Cir. 1995); Loehrer v.
McDonnell Douglas, 91-1747 (E.D. Mo. 1992). But see International
Union, United Mine Workers v. ,Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 8
l.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1601, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH) HHH5 (11th Cir. 1993)
(striking jury demand); Bledsoe v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, 258 F.
Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (striking jury demand).

,I

[Section 10:12]
1 Under WARN, government.al units can receive civil penalties of not
more than $500 a day for each day of violation. However, this penalty
does not apply if the employer pays its employees WARN damages within
three weeks of the plant closing or layoff. 2H U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(3).
@
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days' back pay, as well as the benefits to which they would
have been entitled under their employee benefit plan, including medical expenses incurred during the employment loss
that would have been covered under the plan had no employment loss occurred. 2 There are two conflicting methods of
calculating WARN damages. Under the calendar-day approach, each aggrieved employee is entitled to back pay and
benefits for each calendar day of the violation. Under the
work-day approach, the aggrieved employee is entitled to
damages for each day of the violation on which he or she
would have worked. 3
The Third Circuit stands alone in adopting the calendarday interpretation. In North Star Steel, the court noted the
lack of statutory or regulatory reference to "work days/,
found that a work-day interpretation would render the offset
provisions of 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(2) superfluous, and relied
on the plain language of the statute in holding that WARN
"uses the term 'back pay> simply as a label to describe the
daily rate of the damages payable,,,4
The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
all upheld the work-day computation, relying on nearly
identical rationales. 5 Each of these courts found that the use
229 U.S.C.A § 2104(a)(l)(B). Employees are also entitled to recover the
tips they would have received from third parties as part of the backpay
owed them under WARN. Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender
Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152, 17 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
796, 143 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10958, 50 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 511 (9th Cir. 2001).
3The work-day approach is obviously far less favorable for employees:
given a full 60-day violation period, and baning any unpaid holidays, the
employee who had a five-day workweek would be entitled to only 41 days
of damages, while employees who worked fewer days would recover even
less.
4United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. North Star Steel
Co., Inc., 5 F.3d 39, 43, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1281, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
~ 10851 (3d Cir. 1993).
6Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994); Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 10 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 1473, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11413 (10th Cir. 1995); Saxion v.
Titan-C-Manufacturing, Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 11 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1321, 131
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11589, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 919, 1996 FED App. 0159P
(6th Cir. 1996); Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Companies, Inc., 140
F.3d 797, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1533, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 10139 (8th
Cir. 1998); Burns v. Stone Forest Industries, Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 14 I.E.R.
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of the term "back pay" in WARN creates a textual ambiguity
because of its compensatory connotation in other legislative
contexts. Given the ambiguity, each court then turned to the
legislative history, finding support there for the work-day
approach.
The calendar-day reading best serves the plain language
of WARN and its purpose: requiring advance notification of
plant closings and mass layoffs to provide "workers and their
families some transition time to adjust to the prospective
loss of employment, to seek and obtain alternative jobs and,
if necessary, to enter skill training or retraining that will allow . . . workers to successfully compete in the job market." 6
The work-day approach undermines this purpose by removing most of the incentive to comply with WARN: employers,
if held fully liable under this approach, must pay damages
equal to what they would have paid in wages had they
complied with WARN in the first instance. Conversely, a
calendar-day interpretation makes the employer liable for
an amount potentially greater than the cost of the initial
compliance, thus providing an incentive to comply.
Although WARN does not specifically address the award of
prejudgment interest,7 it is routinely awarded. 8
WARN does not authorize a court to enjoin a plant closure
Cas. (BNA) 193 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Kelly v. Sabretech Inc., 106 F.
Supp. 2d 1283, 139, 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 461, 139 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
~ 10514 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
6 20 C.F.R. § 639.l(a).
7Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1288, 9 1.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ~ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994), the court reasoned that an award of
prejudgment interest in WARN cases is permissible, since WARN
expressly preserves other rights and remedies that an employee may
have, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2105, and prejudgment interest is authorized under
28 U.S.C.A. § 1961.
The court also held that award of prejudgment interest furthers congressional policy under WARN. Specifically, "[a]warding prejudgment
interest serves the dual purpose of making an employee whole by allowing
for an adjustment in the value of the money that an employee was supposed to receive in the past . . . and by providing an incentive to employers to promptly comply with their obligations under the Act." Id.
See also United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. North
Star Steel Co., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 5, 9, 8 1.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 129, 125 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) ~ 10686 (M.D. Pa. 1992), a:ff'd in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 5 F.3d 39, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1281, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
©

West, a Thomson business, 5/2004

10-31

§

10:12

EMPLOYEE AND UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO LABOR

LAw

or layoff.' It also does not, on the other hand, preempt any
claims for injunctive relief that employees might have under
other federal laws or state law .10
Under WARN a court may, at its discretion, award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs. 11 As
with other civil rights statutes that provide for attorneys'
fees, prevailing plaintiffs under WARN should ordinarily recover their attorneys' fees unless special circumstances exist
,i 10851 (3d Cir. 1993); Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Intern. Broth. of Elec.
Workers, 150 F.R.D. 29, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 10790 (E.D. N.Y. 1993),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 34 F.3d 1148, 147 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2176, 128 Lab. Cas, (CCH) ,i 11167, 30 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 79 (2d Cir.
1994).
8See, e.g., Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA)
1473, 130 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 11413 (10th Cir. 1995); Carpenters Dist.
Council of New Orleans and Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 790 F.
Supp. 663, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 609, 123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 10355 (E.D.
La. 1992), order amended, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 799 (E.D. La. 1992) and
afl'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 15 F.3d 1275, 9
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 11024 (5th Cir. 1994).
929 U.S.C.A. § 2104. Local 217, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union
v. MHM, Inc., 976 F.2d 805, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1313, 123 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) ,i 10415, 123 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 10465 (2d Cir. 1992) held that Section 2104, which declares backpay to be the exclusive remedy, also barred
an injunction requiring the employer to maintain employees' medical
benefits. Plaintiffs might, on the other hand, be entitled to an injunction
preventing an employer from dissipating its assets on a sufficient showing
of fraudulent conveyance or concealment. Local 397, Intern. Union of
Electronic, Elec., Salaried, Mach. and Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 78, 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 39, 119
Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 10827 (D.N.J. 1990).
1029 U.S.C.A. § 2105. We address unions' ability to rely on the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement to enjoin employers from closing a plant or relocating work in§ 3:15.
Employees cannot, on the other hand, use state collection procedures
to add to or circumvent the WARN Act's exclusive remedies. In re Bluffton
Casting Corp., 186 F.3d 857, 34 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1136, 15 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 786, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2096, 139 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 10515
(7th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by, In re Bentz Metal Products
Co., Inc., 253 F.3d 283, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 277, 167 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2344, 143 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,i 11015 (7th Cir. 2001) (employees may not
use Indiana's mechanics' lien law to collect backpay they claimed they
were owed under WARN).
11 29 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(6).
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that would render such an award unjust. 12
A prevailing defendant in a WARN action is not entitled
to attorneys' fees unless the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. 13 Moreover, success on one of
several WARN claims is sufficient to deem the plaintiffs
"prevailing parties" for an award of attorneys' fees. 14
Workers are increasingly being presented with waivers
and small severance packages as inducements to waive any
and all rights against their employers. Facing imminent job
loss and the economic insecurity it brings, the pressure to
sign a waiver is often intense. Addressing the issue, the
court in Depalma v. Reality IQ Corp. 15 held that federal law
contro11ed whether the releases were valid, and that a federal
"totality of the circumstances" test should be applied. Factors relevant to this inquiry included: "( 1) the plaintiff's
education and business experience, (2) the amount of time
the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement
before signing it, (3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the terms
of the agreement, (4) the clarity of the agreement, (5)
whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with
an attorney, (6) whether the consideration given in exchange
for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract law." 16 Moreover, the
court noted that other courts have considered a seventh
factor-whether an employer encouraged an employee to
consult an attorney and whether the employee had a fair opportunity to do so.
§ 10:13

Reduction of employer liability

The maximum liability of the employer is reduced for every
12 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. North Star Steel
Co., Inc., 5 F.3d 39, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1281, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
111085 l (~id Cir. H>93); Solberg v. Inline Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 5 I.KR.
Cas. (l3NA) 809, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCI-I) 1110G49 (D. Minn. 1990) (applying
same standard for attorneys' fees as applies in civil rights cases under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1988).
13Solberg v. Inli1rn Corp., 740 F. Supp. 680, 5 l.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 809,
118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110649 (I). Minn. 1990) (applying same standard for
attorneys' foes as applies in civil rights cases under 42 U.S.C.A. § l 988).
14 Ilollowell v. Orleans Regional Hosp. LLC, 217 F.3d 379, 1 G I.E.R.
Cas. (RNA) 83:'l, 141 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 11107G5 (5th Cir. 2000).
15 DePalma v. Realty IQ Corp., 2002 WL 461G47 (S.I). N.Y. 2002).
16 DePalma v. Realty IQ Corp., 2002 WL 46HH7 (SJ). N.Y. 2002).
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day of notice actually provided. 1 Liability may also be
reduced by any ''voluntary and unconditional payment" made
by the employer to the employee for the period of the violation that is ''not required by any legal obligation."2 Liability
will also be reduced by "any payment by the employer to a
third party or trustee (such as premiums for health benefits
or payments to a defined contribution pension plan) on behalf
of and attributable to the employee for the period of the
violation. "3
WARN provides that a court may reduce the liability of
"an employer in violation, who proves that the act or omission was done in good faith and the employer had reasonable
grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a
violation ofWARN. 4 The employer bears the burden of proof
in establishing this defense, which should be construed narrowly because WARN is a remedial statute. 5
To receive a "good faith" reduction, the employer must
prove that it either believed at the time notice was required
to be given that it was providing 60 days' notice or that it fit
[Section 10:13]
129 U.S.C.A. § 2104(2).
229 U.S.C.A. § 2104(c)(2)(B).
329 U.S.C.A. § 2104(a)(2)(C). The court in Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1569, 135 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 110150 (3d Cir. 1998) refused, on the other hand, to use employees' severance pay as an offset against the WARN backpay they were
owed, reasoning that these payments did not represent pay for work
performed during the notice period.
Courts have also given close scrutiny to waivers obtained by employers in return for severance benefits. The court in DePalma v. Realty IQ
Corp., 2002 WL 461647 (S.D. N.Y. 2002), held that a federal "totality of
the circumstances" test should be applied to judge whether this waiver
was, in fact, knowing and voluntary. See§ 10:12. DePalma v. Realty IQ
Corp., 2002 WL 461647 (S.D. N.Y. 2002), held that a federal "totality of
the circumstances" test should be applied to judge whether this waiver
was, in fact, knowing and voluntary. See§ 10:12.
429 U.S.C.A. § 2104(4).
5washington v. Aircap Industries, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 307, 9 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1395, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 11237 (D.S.C. 1994). But cf. Kildea v.
Electro Wire Products, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Mich. 1999), affd,
144 F.3d 400, 13 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1665, 135 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 10164,
1998 Fed. Appx. 0145P (6th Cir. 1998).
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within one of the defenses allowing shortened or no notice. 6
Good faith is subject to an objective, not a subjective,
standard. 7 Evidence of an employer's acts after the violation
is irrelevant. 8
An employer's subjective belief that the Jaw is not what it
is, or that an adverse business circumstance may change,
does not operate to exempt the employer from liability under
WARN. 9 To the extent that an employer relies on the advice
of counsel to establish this defense, it must waive the
attorney-client privilege. 10
The employer's conduct need not be "callous" to negate
this defense. 11 Nonetheless, some courts have accepted the
defense where employees learned of a definite impending
closing well in advance of the actual closing and have general ideas of when they would be permanently laid off. 12
However, failure to give notice as soon as possible will often
6 Kildea v. Electro-Wire Products, Inc., 2:38 F.:Jd 122 (6th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished, text in Westlaw).
7 Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, [nc., 15 F.:-ld 1275, 1288, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (llNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas.
(CCII) ii 11024 (5th Cir. 1994).
8,Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1276, 6 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 7:32, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCI[) ii 10559 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
9 Castro v. Chicago Housing Authority, 20 I.E.l{. Cas. (BNA) 216, 200cl
WL 2151Kl21 (N.D. Ill. 200::l), afl'd, 2004 WL 4;34173 (7th Cir. 2004);
Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 15 F.:':lcl 1275, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (RNA) 289, 127 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
iJ 11024 (5th Cir. 1994); Washington v. Aircap Industries, Inc., 860 F.
Supµ. :307, 9 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1395, 129 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 1111287 (D.S.C.
1994) (same); Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1276, 6
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 782, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCII) 1110559 (E.D. 'l'enn. 1990)
(defendant's subjective belief that contract would be renewed at last minute is not sufficient to reduce liability for good faith).
10 Local 1239, Intern. Broth. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers v. Allsteel, Inc., 10 I.KR Cas. (BNA)
1839, 1995 WL 348028, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
11 United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. North Star Steel
Co., Inc., 817 F. Supp. 522, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 619, 121 Lab. Cas. (CCII)
ii 101:38 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
12 Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Intern. Union, Local 7-515, AFLClO v. American Home Products Corp., 790 F. Supp. 1411, 7 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 673, 125 Lab. Cas. (CCII) ii 10653 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (employees
learned they would be laid off over year in advance and some knew the
quarter in which they would lose their jobs, all much more than 60 clays
in advance); United Auto. Aerospace & Agr. Implement of America, Local
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undermine this defense. 13 Finally, at least one court has held
that failure to give conditional notice may evidence a lack of
good faith. 14
§ 10:14

WARN claims in bankruptcy

Faltering employers are increasingly relying on the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, it is no surprise that
many WARN Act claims wind up before a bankruptcy judge.
Because WARN claims are treated as claims for wages
earned within 90 days of the cessation of the debtor's business, the first $4,650 of such claims receive priority treatment under Bankruptcy Code§ 507(a)(3). 1 Moreover, to the
extent that the violation occurs postpetition, such claims
should be given administrative priority. 2
The success of WARN claims in bankruptcy depends, of
course, on whether the employing entity is considered an
1077 v. Shadyside Stamping Corp., 6 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1640, 1991 WL
340191, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (employees learned of closing five months in
advance).
13Washington v. Aircap Industries Corp., 831 F. Supp. 1292, 8 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 1290 (D.S.C. 1993) (same day notice, where earlier notice possible, barred good faith defense); Wholesale and Retail Food Distribution
Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Services, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 326, 8 I.E.R.
Cas. (BNA) 778, 126 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,r 10860 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (delaying
one week); Local 1239, Intern. Broth. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers v. Allsteel, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 901, 14
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 406 (N.D. ID. 1998) (delaying ten days).
14Jones v. Kayser-Roth Hosiery, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1276, 1291-1292, 6
I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 732, 118 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,r 10559 (E.D. Tenn. 1990).
[Section 10:14]
1In re Riker Industries, Inc., 151 B.R. 823, 8, 8 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 519
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993); In re Cargo, Inc., 138 B.R. 923, 7, 22 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. (CRR) 1193, 7 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 481, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 74534,
121 Lab. Cas. (CCH) ,r 10123 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1992). This Guide
discusses unions' and employees' rights in Bankruptcy Court proceedings
in much greate1· detail in Ch 14.
2In re Hanlin Group, Inc., 176 B.R. 329, 26 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 576,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 76354 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995). Some courts have
held that employees' claims are entitled to administrative priority only if
employees provide services after the date of the bankruptcy petition. In re
Kitty Hawk, Inc., 255 B.R. 428 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
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"employer" for the purposes of WARN. 3 One court has held
that, under certain circumstances, a jury trial may be
implicitly waived by commencing a WARN action in bankruptcy court. 4 Finally, when a prepetition summary judgment motion is pending in a district court, the bankruptcy
court may allow the district court to decide the motion. 5
§ 10:15

Federal laws providing benefits for
dislocated workers

The Trade Act of 1974 1 provides for Trade Adjustment Assistance benefits, commonly known as Trade Readjustment
Allowances, for workers who have lost their jobs or suffered
a reduced work schedule as a result of increased imports.
The DOL can provide job placement, counseling and testing,
job search allowances, relocation allowances, payment for
cost of training, and cash payments after unemployment insurance is exhausted.
A union or any group of three workers can petition for
these benefits. Individual employees must, however, apply in
a timely fashion for the particular benefits that the DOL
provides. 2
Any relief depends on certification by the DOL that (1)
workers have been totally or partially laid off, (2) sales or
productions have declined, and (3) increased imports have
contributed importantly to worker layoffs. If the DOL rules
against them, then the petitioners can file either a request
for reconsideration with the DOL or a judicial appeal with
3 In re Reilly, 235 B.R. 239 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999); In re United
Healthcare System, Inc., 200 F.3d 170, 15, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 105,
15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1470, 140 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1110628 (3d Cir. 1999)
4 In re Commercial Financial Services, Inc., 252 B.R. 516, 36 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 181, 44 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB) 1272, 16 I.E.R. Cas.
(BNA) 1220 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000).
5 In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 277 B.R. 74, 39 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(CRR) 150 (Banh. W.D. Pa. 2002).

[Section 10:15]
1 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2271 et seq. The North American Free Trade AgTeement Transitional Adjustment Assistance Program provides similar
benefits. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2331.
2 The Department of Labor's regulations set out the procedures for applying for these benefits at 20 C.F.R. § 617.10. Those regulations can be
found at http://www.access.gpo.govnaracfrwaisi~0220cfr617 _02.html.
'f.
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the U.S. Court of International Trade.
Although the court has upheld the DOL's denial of certification in cases in which the DOL made no attempt to verify
the employer's claims,3 it has remanded cases for further
investigation when the DOL's own investigation should have
alerted it to the possibility that the employer was lying. 4 The
court will also order a claim certified if it concludes that the
Department of Labor is unable or unwilling to conduct an
adequate investigation. 5
3Local 167, Intern. Molders and Allied Workers' Union, AFL-CIO, on
Behalf of Group of Aggrieved Workers Under 19 U.S.C. § 2322 v.
Marshall, 643 F.2d 26, 2 Int'l Trade Re. (BNA) 1416 (1st Cir. 1981).
4 Callebaut v. Herman, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 23 Int'l Trade Re. (BNA)
2184 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001).
5Former Employees of Hawkins Oil and Gas, Inc. v. U.S. Secretary of
Labor, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 126, 814 F. Supp. 1111, 15 Int'l Trade Re. (BNA)
1220 (1993).
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